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Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Juries Don’t Get It
Hon. James A. Shapiro* and Karl T. Muth**
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been de rigueur in criminal cases
almost since the dawn of the republic. It is based on the premise that it is
better to let several guilty people go free in order to save one innocent person
from wrongful conviction.
The jury in a criminal case is not merely an audience. It is the central
mechanism without which the wheels of American criminal justice cannot
turn—and operates as the final safeguard against a grave error. However,
while the Constitution describes the importance, composition, and role of the
jury, it does not explicitly use the phrase “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Though not mentioned in our founding document, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is “an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice
system.” As such, this Article does not question its conceptual wisdom, but
rather its jurisprudential implementation.
Yet the meaning of “beyond a reasonable doubt” is apparently not selfevident. Jurors constantly ask for definitions of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some jurisdictions allow such a definition. Some require it. Others forbid it
entirely under the supposition that its meaning is obvious and requires no
definition.
Juries are understandably curious and concerned about the meaning of
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” They correctly assert to judges that it
is not self-explanatory (despite many judges’ erroneous insistence to the
contrary). This creates real and significant risk the standard under which
defendants are convicted is constitutionally inadequate.
When jurors misapprehend how high the burden of proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt is, they are in danger of convicting the innocent, the
gravest kind of mistake that is called “Type I error.” When they let a guilty
person go free, they commit a less serious kind of mistake called “Type II
error.” In fact, the theory behind proof beyond a reasonable doubt (letting
several guilty people go free in order to save one innocent person) actually
contemplates Type II error.
The authors posit that many jurors simply don’t understand how high a
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is supposed to be. They propose
redefining proof beyond a reasonable doubt to make it more intelligible to
the average juror. They realize the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
veritably sacrosanct in American law, but they don’t believe “that’s the way
it’s always been” is a good reason to perpetuate a standard of proof that is
unintelligible to the average juror. They suggest changing the burden to a
two-step analysis: (1) Did the prosecutor prove each and every element of
the crime charged? (2) If so, keeping in mind the extraordinary injustice in
the possibility of convicting an innocent person, are you convinced to a
moral certainty? The authors are convinced that if American law can
somehow let go of its “beyond a reasonable doubt” tradition, the incidence
of grievous Type I error will be much lower.

I. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE REASONABLE DOUBT ................................... 1033
II. REASONABLE DOUBT OR REASONABLE CONSENSUS? .................... 1035
III. THE PROBLEM .............................................................................. 1042
IV. THE SOLUTION ............................................................................. 1044
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution require prosecutors to prove criminal
defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a
conviction.1 “The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ‘plays
a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure,’ because it
operates to give ‘concrete substance’ to the presumption of innocence to
ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error
in a criminal proceeding.”2 It reflects the basic American value that it is

1. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994) (“The Due Process Clause requires the
government to prove a criminal defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
2. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363); see
generally Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule,
55 B.U. L. REV. 507 (1975).
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better to let the guilty go free than to convict the innocent.3
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has traditionally been regarded as
the decisive difference between criminal culpability and civil liability.”4
At the same time, by impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a
subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard
symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal
sanction and thus to liberty itself.5 Although a juror must subjectively
believe that a defendant has been proven guilty, that subjective belief
must be based upon a reasoned, objective evaluation of the evidence, and
a proper understanding of the quantum of proof necessary to establish
guilt to a “near certitude.”6
Juries, however, have a difficult time truly comprehending the
meaning of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”7 It is particularly difficult for
jurors to understand they must acquit a criminal defendant if the
prosecution does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even if
they feel the defendant is “probably” guilty.8 It is this conversion from
the phrase “reasonable doubt” to a probability that repeatedly proves
problematic. Jurors may well be reluctant to free someone accused of a
serious and violent crime “merely” because the government didn’t prove
beyond a reasonable doubt what they feel “in their hearts” is probably
true.9 But due process is served by nothing less than a juror’s
understanding that he or she may not vote to convict a defendant based
3. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the basic American
value judgment that it is better to let the guilty go free than to convict the innocent); WAYNE
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46 (1972) (noting the
public must know the innocent are not convicted for criminal law to maintain its ethical force);
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 798 (Edward Cleary
ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting the societal belief that the guilty should go free rather than the innocent
be found guilty).
4. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315.
5. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
6. United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1999).
7. Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 728 (“Reasonable doubt is not an easy concept to understand, and it
is all the more difficult to explain.”); State v. Bennett, 165 P.3d 1241, 1248 (Wash. 2007) (“We
recognize that the concept of reasonable doubt seems at times difficult to define and explain.”);
Walter W. Steele & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 88–94 (1988); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan,
Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480–82 (1976) (discussing the results of
a study showing that many jurors do not understand the law sufficiently); Norbert L. Kerr & Robert
S. Atkin, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision
Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 285–86 (1976)
(finding that fewer hung juries result when reasonable doubt is defined). John S. Siffert, Instructing
on the Burden of Proof and Reasonable Doubt, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 365, 367 (1987)
(discussing the lack of uniformity among the circuits in giving jury instructions).
8. Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 728.
9. Id.
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upon a belief “that the defendant is probably guilty.”10
Some jurisdictions require the trial judge to instruct juries on the
meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt,11 some permit it,12 and others
proscribe it.13 The Federal Constitution neither requires nor prohibits trial
courts from defining the term “reasonable doubt.”14 The sole requirement
is that the trial court accurately instructs the jury on the “concept” that
the state has the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.15 The Supreme Court deferentially reviews the substance of
reasonable doubt definitions and finds error only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury in fact understood the instruction to permit
conviction based on proof below the reasonable doubt standard.16

10. Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)).
11. See, e.g., State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz. 1995) (“Pursuant to our supervisory
authority and revisory jurisdiction . . . we instruct that in every criminal case trial courts shall give
the reasonable doubt instruction that we set forth below.”); Lansdowne v. State, 412 A.2d 88, 93
(Md. 1980) (“[A] trial judge in a criminal case, must give an instruction correctly explaining
‘reasonable doubt’ if requested by the accused.”); State v. Bennett, 165 P.3d 1241, 1249 (Wash.
2007) (“We also exercise our inherent supervisory power to instruct Washington trial courts to use
only the approved pattern instruction . . . to instruct juries that the government has the burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
12. See, e.g., Hernandez, 176 F.3d at 729 (permitting the definition but finding unconstitutional
the subjective instruction, “[i]t’s what you in your own heart and your own soul and your own spirit
and your own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v.
Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding district courts have discretion
whether to define reasonable doubt). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 2021)
(“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: ‘It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything
relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors
in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.”),
with Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction No. 220 (“Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need
not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt.”) (grudgingly approved in People v. Pierce, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009));
see also Samford v. State, 302 S.W.3d 552, 558 (Tex. App. 2009) (permitting definition despite
precedent discouraging practice).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that reasonable
doubt should not be defined and that the term must speak for itself as jurors know what the words
mean).
14. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994) (discussing that either with or without a definition,
the jury instructions do not violate the Constitution); see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1421 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending Sixth Amendment rights include protection
against convictions on the basis of non-unanimous jury outcomes, which can only be met when
there is no doubt).
15. Victor, 511 U.S. at 22; see also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 439 (1887) (noting that “abiding
conviction” as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states government’s burden
of proof).
16. Victor, 511 U.S. at 22; see also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1990) (disapproving
of the definition that suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal).
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I. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE REASONABLE DOUBT
The prototypical definition of reasonable doubt was set forth by Chief
Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster17: “It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge.”18 Over a half century later, in State v. De Lea,19 Justice Smith
of the Montana Supreme Court found no error in Chief Justice Shaw’s
mid-nineteenth century definition, but found the definition of reasonable
doubt more complicated than reasonable doubt itself:
I am inclined to think, despite the fact that the definition of
‘reasonable doubt’ . . . discussed [in the majority opinion] has been
employed by the courts of this and other states for so many years, and
has been approved, that it is not too late to discourage the practice of
giving it to juries in criminal cases. It seems that the English language
is inadequate to satisfactorily define the phrase ‘reasonable doubt.’
Some courts are not satisfied with the definition approved by this court.
How, then, shall a jury of layman be guided or aided by it? Perhaps the
reason why the words are difficult of explanation is because they are so
ordinary and simple. At any rate, the definition, although the best that
has ever been given and perhaps the best that can be framed, is so
complicated and involved that it is more difficult to understand than are
the words the meaning of which [the] courts have attempted to explain.
I do not think the words ‘reasonable doubt’ require explanation. I
believe that any juror who has not the mental capacity to understand the
words themselves could not possibly comprehend the definition given
to them by the courts. How can it be said that a juror could not
understand what is meant by a ‘reasonable doubt’ but would know the
meaning of the words ‘an abiding conviction to a moral certainty,’ used
in the definition? I think any intelligent juror will appreciate the scope
of his duty when told that, before he is justified in arriving at a verdict
of guilty, he must be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt; and that no other or further charge
should be given on this subject.
17. 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Russell, 23 N.E.3d 867 (Mass.
2015); see also Miller W. Shealy, Jr., A Reasonable Doubt About “Reasonable Doubt”, 65 OKLA.
L. REV. 225, 230 (2013) (arguing for current adoption of Chief Justice Shaw’s mid-19th century
definition).
18. Webster, 59 Mass. at 320. The Supreme Court has since cast doubt on the efficacy of “moral
certainty” as part of a reasonable doubt definition. See Cage, 498 U.S. at 41 (“When [statements
like ‘substantial’ and ‘grave’] are then considered with the reference to ‘moral certainty,’ rather
than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the
instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause.”).
19. 93 P. 814, 818–19 (Mont. 1908) (Smith, J. concurring).
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I undertake to say that every honest juror who, upon the whole
evidence, has in his heart a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt,
will act upon it, without analysis or application of definition. He will
unconsciously heed it without seeking to explain it. When his mind
harbors a doubt that prevents his conscientiously voting guilty, that
doubt will be expressed in a vote of acquittal.
I maintain, therefore, that we should give our trial judges credit for
the integrity, learning, discretion, and consideration for their oaths of
office that they in reality possess, and that our jurors should be treated
as men of intelligence, and not as children.20

Perhaps jurors of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were more intelligent than today’s, because judging by their jury
questions, many (if not most) of today’s jurors are just not “getting it.”
In People v. Brigham,21 Justice Mosk, concurring with the majority,
wrote:
Happily there is another alternative, a solution adopted by fully half
of the states of the Union and long advocated by leading scholars. These
authorities recognize that all attempts to define the phrase ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ are at once futile and unnecessary. They are futile
because, as we have seen, the definition is more complicated than the
phrase itself and results in confusing rather than enlightening the jury;
they are unnecessary because ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is not a technical legal term requiring learned explanation, but a phrase of common
meaning and usage that is known to and understood by the average juror. From these premises both courts and Legislatures have concluded
that in criminal cases the jury should simply be instructed on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, with no effort being made to define the latter phrase.22

In Victor v. Nebraska,23 Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence explicitly
endorsed the following definition from the Federal Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world
that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does
not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
599 P.2d 100 (Cal. 1979).
Id. at 116 (Mosk, J., concurring).
511 U.S. 1 (1994).
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other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.24

This may be the best of the definitions, but the mere fact juries have to
ask for a definition so often is evidence that “beyond a reasonable doubt”
is “beyond” many of their comprehensions.25 “Beyond a reasonable
doubt” is an epistemological standard that most lawyers and judges can
fathom, but most jurors cannot;26 it is a standard lawyers and judges may
simultaneously find easy to understand but find maddeningly difficult to
adequately describe.
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted a definition from its
pattern instructions: “A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists
and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as
would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and
carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. [If, from
such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge,
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.]”27
II. REASONABLE DOUBT OR REASONABLE CONSENSUS?
Fundamentally, there are two ways to conceptualize the mechanism of
a jury: as a single unit making decisions, or as a democracy composed of
twelve individual constituents—the caucus approach and the voter
approach. In the caucus approach, the jury is simply a framework within
which ideas converge and unanimity is achieved.28 Meanwhile, in the
voter approach, each person enjoys agency to offer input, object to others’
views, and interfere with unanimous outcomes.29
24. Id. at 22 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, 17–18
(Instruction 21)).
25. See Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal
Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 334 (1988)
(describing arguments surrounding the view that “lay jurors are not capable of comprehending the
factual complexity inherent in much modern civil litigation”).
26. Valerie P. Hans, Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of
Juries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 588 (2007) (analyzing the way jurors understand instructions
and how they react in a jury setting).
27. State v. Bennett, 165 P.3d 1241, 1243, 1249 (Wash. 2007) (reluctantly approving alternative
instruction while exercising supervisory authority to tell Washington courts to use pattern
instructions).
28. In this Article, authored post-Ramos, a requirement of unanimity is presumed. Empirical
research performed on mock juries with different agreement thresholds is informative, but not
explored in depth in this Article. For more on less-than-unanimous caucus approaches, see James
H. Davis et al., The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and
Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1 (1975).
29. “Unanimous” in this context refers to a universal agreement among jurors, not an agreement
on all charges—importantly, the former is a requirement, and the latter is not. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
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There are several reasons this distinction matters. The most obvious is
that jurists or advocates who see the jury as a caucus responsible for
reaching consensus will address and consider the jury differently from
those who see it as a population of individual voters to be won over. Less
obvious is the observation that “beyond a reasonable doubt” can be
thought of, in the context of the voter approach, as “twelve out of
twelve”30 certainty.31 Meanwhile, in the caucus approach, reasonable
doubt loses this per capita quantification, the jury instead being a single
entity trying to be sure with a high degree of certainty.
Importantly, the Supreme Court draws a distinction between “twelve
out of twelve” and simply any unanimous verdict (five out of five, for
instance).32 While Justices Blackmun and Stevens conceded there is no
magic in the number twelve, Ballew v. Georgia teaches the factfinding
machine with twelve parts (the parts being jurors) computes justice more
precisely than one equipped with only five parts.33 Though the opinion
does not explain or quantify what value the individual sixth, seventh,
eighth, and so on juror contributes, Ballew shows a willingness of the
Court to wrestle with these fractions seriously.34 In other words, “twelve
out of twelve” in a typical proceeding does not equal “nine out of twelve”
in Johnson35 or “five out of five” in Ballew. Nor would, it follows, “nine
out of twelve” fairly be seen to contain within it a “nine out of nine”

31(b)(2) (“If the jury cannot agree on all counts as to any defendant, the jury may return a verdict
on those counts on which it has agreed.”).
30. Justice Blackmun’s comments in Ballew, suggesting even a unanimous five-out-of-five
jury, for instance, would substantially threaten the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of
fairness. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978) (Blackmun, J.) (concluding juries smaller
than six are not permissible in criminal matters); see also Brief of Law Professors and Social
Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)
(No. 18-5924) (discussing the “twelve out of twelve” standard).
31. State jury verdicts for serious crimes must be unanimous in the United States. See Ramos,
140 S. Ct. at 1395 (concluding state juries must reach unanimous findings of guilty in serious
criminal matters), abrogating Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
32. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239 (asserting that while juries of twelve have no special wisdom or
magic, juries must not be pared to numbers that harm justice or fairness (i.e., panels smaller than
6)).
33. See Carl E. Singley, Ballew v. Georgia: Five Is Not Enough. For What?, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
217, 249–50 (1979) (describing the “cautious words and phrases” used by Justice Blackmun when
describing the data that “‘suggests’ that ‘progressively smaller’ juries are ‘less likely’ to foster
‘effective’ group deliberation”).
34. “The prosecution had to garner only nine votes of the 12-member jury to convict in a felony
trial. The Court held that the statute did not violate the due process guarantee by diluting the
reasonable doubt standard.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 240 (Blackmun, J.) (expanding upon the Court’s
discussion in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972)).
35. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 364.
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unanimous result from a smaller jury that excluded the three contrary
jurors.36
The Framers of the Constitution were deeply concerned37 with the
design38 and implications of the American jury system, and perhaps no
one more so than James Madison,39 who felt he had a first-hand
understanding of the English courts’ injustices.40 The Framers’ most
comprehensive discussion of jury trials occurs in one of Alexander
Hamilton’s treatises containing concerns and suggestions presumably
addressed to John Jay.41 Juries in criminal cases safeguard liberty,42
Hamilton argues, and protect citizens43 from arbitrary convictions,
politically motivated prosecutions, and the whims of judges (“judicial
despotism”).44 Hamilton feared power might be vested only in judges
drawn from an elite and corrupt ruling class too socially, culturally, and
economically distant from the citizenry.45 This would lead to distrust and
disrepute of the courts, as it had in the case of England’s plutocratic law

36. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970) (concluding a criminal jury is not
required to have twelve members, but the specific jury size is not without relevance or limitations).
37. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1779, at 540–41 (Thomas McIntyre Cooley ed., The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 4th ed. 2008) (1873).
38. As to the purpose of the jury framework, see generally Letter from John Adams to William
Stephens Smith (Dec. 21, 1786).
39. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789).
40. Id.; see also 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 154–59 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)
(discussing the value of lay persons in making decisions, and the injustices of the English
government and court systems).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
42. Id. at 498 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable
safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.”).
43. This concept of juries protecting not only the individual, but society’s trust in the courts, is
echoed in Blackstone; on his concern regarding any reduction or limitation of the matters on which
juries are convened to deliberate, Blackstone writes, “though begun in trifles, the precedent may
gradually increase and spread to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous
concern.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 395, at 350–
51 (William Carey Jones ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1915) (1765) (cited in Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 39–40 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 supra note 41, at 498 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
45. William III attempted to address this issue by making judges service “tenure during good
behavior,” which the Framers saw as an insufficient safeguard. Act of Settlement 1700, 12 & 13
Will. III, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.); see also E. NEVILLE WILLIAMS, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
CONSTITUTION 59 (1960) (noting judges serve “quamdiu se bene gesserint” or as long as they
behave themselves).
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lords46 and in older societies.47 Juries were meant to diversify the pool of
potential factfinders in the justice system.48
This hope for juror representation also suggests the “voter approach”
may be closer to a Hamiltonian ideal. Why, after all, have twelve jurors
rather than one or one hundred? While one hundred might be absurd and
unwieldy,49 if the goal is consensus and efficiency and the jury is
considered as a single decision-making entity, a single empowered
individual chosen from the citizenry might be just as good as twelve.50
The concept of reasonable doubt as “twelve out of twelve” certainty51 is
particularly useful if one considers the concept of “justice” in criminal
proceedings can be explained as a ratio: what is an acceptable ratio of
innocent people convicted to guilty people set free?
Where convicting an innocent person is called “Type I error,”52 a
culpable person set free is called “Type II error.”53 What proportion of
Type I to Type II error is desired in our society or would be produced by

46. C. H. McIlwain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 217, 218 (1913).
47. See generally Edward Van Dyke Robinson, The Division of Governmental Power in Ancient
Greece, 18 POL. SCI. Q. 614 (1903).
48. The Supreme Court has stated this principle many times and in many ways—in, and well
before, Batson. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (finding a jury formed by
excluding members according to race is no longer representative of community); Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.”); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (noting the purpose of a jury is to assemble “the peers or equals
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine”) abrogated by Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); accord Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)
(excluding certain community members “contravenes the very idea of a jury”).
49. Think: the trial of Socrates to 501 Athenians for impiety and corrupting the youth (although
that jury apparently did not require unanimity to convict or sentence to death): “Legislative trials,
since the trial of Socrates, have had an odious history. Legislative trials combine the functions of
prosecutor and judge and deny to the accused the right to impartial and independent judgment.
Legislative trials are subject to the influence of partisanship, passion and prejudice. Legislative
trials are political trials. Let us remember that in the past legislative justice has tended to degenerate
into mob injustice.” United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 122–23 (1964) (Douglas, J. dissenting)
(quoting Benjamin V. Cohen, When Men Fear to Speak, Freedom Withers on the Vine, Address at
the Indiana B’nai B’rith Convention (Sept. 27, 1953)).
50. But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–33 (1978) (“Generally, a positive correlation
exists between group size and the quality of both group performance and group productivity.”).
51. For a discussion of unanimous versus nonunanimous jury behavior, see Shari Seidman
Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Nonunanimous Civil
Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 208 (2006). For analogous scholarship in the civil context, accord
Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury
Decision Making, 4 DEL. L. REV. 1, 22–28 (2001).
52. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 234 (“Statistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent
person (Type I error) rises as the size of the jury diminishes.”) (parenthetical as in the original).
53. Id. (“[T]he risk of not convicting a guilty person (Type II error) increases with the size of
the panel . . . .”).
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a “fair” society’s courts?54 And this is precisely the question the Court
poses in Ballew:
Statistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent person
(Type I error) rises as the size of the jury diminishes. Because the risk
of not convicting a guilty person (Type II error) increases with the size
of the panel, an optimal jury size can be selected as a function of the
interaction between the two risks.55

The following social science discussion may seem abstract or distant
from typical law review narrative, but it is not merely an aside. Justice
White considered theoretical and empirical evidence from social science
frameworks in Williams,56 and the Court considered research on the
fairness of various outcomes from a six-person jury in Colgrove.57 In
Ballew, Justice Blackmun, writing for a plurality of the Court, cites
seventeen pieces of legal and social science scholarship in a footnote
before the first case citation;58 the works of legal and social science
scholars are not only relevant in theory, but cited in practice in the Court’s
thinking about twelve out of twelve people reaching a conclusion that
meets due process and reasonable doubt standards of certainty.
In this context, Type I error is a “false positive” or a “miscarriage of
justice”59 where a not-guilty defendant is found guilty. Meanwhile Type
II error is a “false negative” or an “error of impunity”60 wherein a
culpable person is found to be not guilty. While reducing errors generally
is certainly desirable, reducing Type I error specifically is understandably
seen as a higher priority. One could interpret the reasonable doubt
standard as a way of saying Type I error is to be avoided with a high
degree of certainty while Type II error is acceptable in moderation.
Even the finest police officers will on occasion suspect innocent people
of crimes, and some of these people will be arrested. Once detained, some
54. This is discussed in some length, conceptually and practically, in BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF
JUSTICE (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 2004).
55. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 234 (internal citations omitted).
56. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101–102, 105 (1970).
57. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 158–160 (1973).
58. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231 n.10 (“Williams v. Florida and Colgrove v. Battin . . . generated
a quantity of scholarly work on jury size.”).
59. Used in the philosophical sense, not in the narrow sense of the exception to untimely Rule
60(b) motions.
60. See Robert M. Bohm, Miscarriages of Criminal Justice, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 196,
196 (2005) (“Errors of impunity refer ‘to a lapse of justice that allows a culpable offender to remain
at large’ or, in some other way, escape justice.” (citation omitted)). For usage, see Edward R.
Maguire et al., Potential Unintended Consequences of the Movement Toward Forensic Laboratory
Independence, 18 POLICE Q. 272, 273–74 (2015) (“Errors of impunity involve failing to sanction,
or imposing insufficient sanctions, on culpable offenders. . . . Any time we erroneously fail to
sanction a guilty person, we are committing an error of impunity, which is analogous to a Type II
error.”).
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prosecutors will choose to seek indictments against some of these
arrestees. Many of these people will be defendants in a criminal matter.
The prevalence of Type I error, stated in the inverse, can be described
with the query: How many innocent people, once arrested and tried, are
convicted?
Jury Finding is Jury Finding is
Not Guilty
Guilty
Defendant is Guilty

Correct Finding

Defendant is Innocent Type I Error

Type II Error
Correct Finding

It is important to note that Type I and Type II errors are minority
outcomes in a functioning judicial system. In other words, in such a
system, the majority of outcomes are guilty people found guilty and
people not culpable correctly acquitted. But small amounts of error are
substantial, and no injustice is insignificant. If mistakes can be prevented
through more nuanced or precise jury instructions, this is a low-cost way
to intervene before grave errors occur. For example, a judicial system that
has 90% accuracy and splits its Type I and Type II errors 50/50, results
in five innocent people convicted per one hundred people tried. On the
other hand, the same error rate where Type II error makes up 80% of
errors only convicts two people wrongly per one hundred defendants
tried. Every error, but especially wrongful conviction, is tragic. And to
the extent all errors, but particularly this type of error, can be prevented,
we should take all reasonable, practicable, and affordable actions that
contribute to that prevention.
In the caucus approach, the group of jurors must collectively be
convinced they are not creating Type I error. However, in the voter
approach, the jurors must each individually be convinced that he or she
is not contributing to—or “voting for”—Type I error. Decades of
experimental evidence supports the proposition that collective decisionmaking is substantially different from individual decision-making.61
While situations where one choice is self-evidently correct are relatively
61. See, e.g., Attila Ambrus et al., Group Versus Individual Decision-Making: Is There a Shift?
2 (Inst. Advanced Study, Sch. Soc. Sci., Working Papers No. 91, 2009).
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easy to resolve for either groups or individuals,62 juries often face choices
where reasonable minds can differ. Years of research illustrates that,
generally, groups are more risk-averse than individuals and more cautious
about making big mistakes (like convicting an innocent defendant) than
absorbing losses that are considered less severe (like finding a culpable
defendant not guilty).63 Hence, the caucus jury is not only distinguishable
from the voter jury, but—perhaps counterintuitively—more cautious and
less likely to convict.64 If the group and the individuals regard Type I
errors as equally undesirable, the risk-averse caucus or group
interpretation of “beyond a reasonable doubt” is, then, possibly an even
higher threshold than a “twelve out of twelve” threshold in the voter
model.
So grave is the Type I error outcome that it must be avoided with every
tool available; this includes the use of clear and helpful—not merely
descriptive—jury instructions to inform those who may or may not reach
“twelve out of twelve” certainty about the defendant’s guilt “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” And to further guard against miscarriages of justice,
we require prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element
of the offense,65 not to simply paint a general picture of a defendant who
is guilty or to suggest that one element has been so convincingly proven
that another element need not be proven to the same high standard.66
While juries may wade through a sea of contradictory accounts and
confusing facts to reach the right verdict in the vast majority of cases, “in
other criminal prosecutions juries may disbelieve and convict the

62. Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and
Group Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 959, 961 (1993).
63. See generally the lineage of literature embracing Gary Charness et al., Individual Behavior
and Group Membership, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1340 (2007); see also Charles A. Holt & Susan K.
Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644 (2002); Norbert L. Kerr et
al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCH. REV. 687, 713–14 (1996);
David G. Myers & Sidney J. Arenson, Enhancement of Dominant Risk Tendencies in Group
Discussion, 30 PSYCH. REP. 615, 616 (1972); Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as
a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 125, 134 (1969).
64. Robert S. Shupp & Arlington W. Williams, Risk Preference Differentials of Small Groups
and Individuals, 118 ECON. J. 258, 272 (2008) (groups making decisions are more risk-averse than
individuals making decisions in high-stakes situations).
65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); see also Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979) (“[T]he State [must] prove every element of a criminal offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
66. “[T]he facts proved must exclude ‘to a moral certainty’ every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” People v. Benzinger, 324 N.E.2d 334, 335 (N.Y. 1974).
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innocent. But the courts must minimize this danger.”67 The Court
recognizes that errors exist and that they are extraordinarily difficult to
evaluate and repair ex post. The Schlup standard,68 for instance, does not
convene a fresh trial with twelve new factfinders to reach a new “twelve
out of twelve” consensus. Nor does it ask whether the jury was correct in
reaching a decision to convict. Rather, the Schlup standard69 asks
appellate judges whether “it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would70 have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”71
a difficult “pound of cure”72 to administer for appellate judges. The best
“ounce of prevention,” then, is prophylactic: to do everything we can to
prevent convictions that result in innocent people being punished and to
carry with us an “ever-present concern that justice not miscarry for the
defendant.”73
III. THE PROBLEM
The mere fact we have to define “beyond a reasonable doubt” suggests
the term itself is ambiguous and beyond many jurors’ comprehension.
Even in jurisdictions that do not permit definition, jury questions asking
for one suggest the standard is out of reach for many of them.
While it is impossible to quantify the burden of proof in terms of
percentage of certainty, comparison with other burdens of proof helps.
The one burden of proof that is easy to quantify is the civil
“preponderance of the evidence” standard. That burden is anything—the
smallest imaginable fraction—over fifty percent. Such a standard would
be equivalent to the average juror’s mere opinion that a criminal
defendant committed the crime. Then there’s the intermediate “clear and

67. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 128 (1954).
68. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321–22 (1995) (applying the Carrier standard and
requiring petitioner to show the constitutional violation “probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent” where defendant-petitioner’s life is at risk, but repairing such error does
not require convening fresh trial with fresh jury).
69. Note this is an issue of jury error, not of the “actual innocence” contemplated in Sawyer.
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
70. Sometimes erroneously cited as “could” rather than “would.” See, e.g., Reeves v. Nooth,
294 Or. App. 711, 737 (2018); Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 231 (3d Cir. 2007). It appears the
source of the error would be from the similarity with the insufficiency of evidence standard
established in Jackson v. Virginia, which asks whether “any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also
Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 542 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the linguistic implications of the
difference between “could” in the Jackson standard and “would” in the Schlup standard).
71. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (“Carrier requires a petitioner to show that he is ‘actually
innocent.’”).
72. Benjamin Franklin, On Protection of Towns from Fire, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 1735.
73. Commonwealth v. Azar, 760 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 2002).
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convincing” burden used in some types of cases.74 While that burden, like
beyond a reasonable doubt, is impossible to accurately quantify in
percentage terms, many think of it as approximately 75% certainty.75 And
we know that beyond a reasonable doubt is a significantly higher standard
than clear and convincing evidence.
When one compares the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a
factfinder being “clearly convinced” of the truth of something, beyond a
reasonable doubt should be upward of 90% certainty. But many (if not
most) jurors invariably minimize this standard because they are reluctant
to “let go” a defendant who actually committed the crime. In other words,
many jurors are less willing to commit Type II error than Type I error. In
fact, prosecutors are trained to subtly minimize their burden of proof by
purporting to embrace it in opening statement and closing argument,
while telling the jury it is “the same burden we have in every criminal
case.”76 In effect they are telling jurors if the burden were so high, there
would never be any criminal convictions.
The strong suspicion is that juries are convicting on evidence that is
truly less than beyond a reasonable doubt.77 It is true that a defendant
convicted on evidence that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt has the
right to appeal on that ground. However, that right is virtually
meaningless, as the defendant’s burden on appeal is to show that “no
rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”78 That
has become a virtually insurmountable burden, as most appellate judges
are reluctant to second-guess a jury’s verdict by essentially calling it
irrational. Consequently, trial juries effectively have the final say on
whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The
collective subjectivity of what a jury deems to be proof beyond a

74. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (noting clear and convincing
evidence is required to terminate parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)
(noting the same is required in involuntary commitment proceedings).
75. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (characterizing the clear-andconvincing evidence standard as one that “could place in the ultimate factfinder and abiding
conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable’” (citing CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 320 (1954)); Evidence, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[C]lear and convincing evidence [is] [e]vidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than
preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials.”).
76. In fact, one of the coauthors was trained to so argue when he was at the U.S. Attorney’s
office in Chicago.
77. As anecdotal evidence of this, one of the authors once asked a North Carolinian who had
served on criminal juries what percentage certainty he believed beyond a reasonable doubt to be.
He responded, “Sixty percent.”
78. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 319 (1979).
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reasonable doubt essentially dwarfs the more objective “no rational trier
of fact” standard on appeal.
IV. THE SOLUTION
One solution is to put the beyond a reasonable doubt standard into
terms that the average juror can understand. Since most jurors seem to
focus on whether they think the defendant really committed the crime or
not, regardless of whether the prosecution actually proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did it, the first “juror-friendly” question in the
analysis could be, “Do you believe the prosecution proved every element
of the crime it charged the defendant with committing?” But in order to
minimize the danger of convicting the innocent (Type I error), as the
reasonable doubt standard purports to do, we could further instruct the
jury, “Keeping in mind the extraordinary injustice in the possibility of
convicting an innocent person,79 are you convinced to a moral
certainty?”80
This solution both puts the burden instruction in terms the average
juror can understand, while emphasizing to that average juror the
importance of avoiding Type I error. Hopefully, with this instruction, jury
questions about the burden will be less frequent, and different
jurisdictions will not have to have different rules about whether to define
the burden. It will finally be self-defining.
The authors realize how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to wean
the republic off a standard to which it has adhered and become
accustomed for well over two centuries. However, “that’s the way it’s
always been done” should never be a rationale for continuing to do it that
way, especially if the way it’s always been done is wrong and leads to
convicting the innocent. Rather, it is the definition of insanity.81
79. In Victor, Justice Blackmun observed that “a central purpose of the instruction is to
minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for the conviction of those who may be innocent.” Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 35 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990); see also Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass.
1, 24 (1875) (Proof to “moral certainty” is equivalent to proof beyond “reasonable doubt”).
“[W]hen we declare . . . such a thing to be morally certain, because it has been confirmed by
creditable [w]itnesses . . . [this] moral [c]ertitude is nothing else but a strong [p]resumption
grounded on probable reasons, and which very seldom fails and deceives us.” 1 SAMUEL VON
PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS § 11, at 24 (Jean Barbeyrac ed., Basil Kennett
trans., London, J. Walthoe, R. Wilkin, J. and J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward, & T. Osborne 4th ed.
1749).
81. Although the quote, “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again
and expecting a different result” is often attributed to Albert Einstein, the attribution is apparently
apocryphal. See Daniel D’Addario, “The Definition of Insanity” is the Most Overused Cliché of All
Time, SALON (Aug. 6, 2013, 6:33 PM), https://www.salon.com/2013/08/06/the_definition_of_insanity_is_the_most_overused_cliche_of_all_time/ [https://perma.cc/Q5VQ-ZKZT].

